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Abstract
Today, most peer-to-peer networks are based on the as-
sumption that the participating nodes are cooperative. This
works if the nodes are indifferent or ignorant about the re-
sources they offer, but limits the usability of peer-to-peer
networks to very few scenarios. It speciﬁcally excludes their
usage in any non-cooperative peer-to-peer environment, be
it Grid networks or mobile ad-hoc networks. By introduc-
ing soft incentives to offer resources to other nodes, we see
an overall performance gain in traditional ﬁle-sharing net-
works. We also see soft incentives promoting the conver-
gence of peer-to-peer and Grid networks, as they increase
the predictability of the participating nodes, and therefore
the reliability of the services provided by the system as a
whole. Reliability is what is required by Grid networks, but
missing in peer-to-peer networks.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a new paradigm for networking architec-
tures has been introduced, or rather re-introduced. This
moves from the dominant client-server architecture, where
one or more centralized servers serve a number of clients, to
a system where any node can take either roles. This model
is referred to as peer-to-peer.
Peer-to-peer became popular quickly, not so much be-
cause of the technology behind it, but for the services it
offers. The early peer-to-peer systems were ﬁle sharing
applications, used to exchange music ﬁles and later also
other types of ﬁles. In these applications, people would let
theircomputersparticipateinthenetwork, sothateveryuser
could download the other user’s audio ﬁles, and vice versa.
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After two years of operation of the ﬁrst of those platforms,
Napster, millions were using it.
Obviously, the reason for the popularity of peer-to-peer
networks is the availability of a huge number of ﬁles. This
was due to the high availability of popular ﬁles as they were
present on a large percentage of users’ hard drives. The in-
herent redundancy of people sharing their own private col-
lectionsmeantthatitwasstatisticallylikelythattherewould
be someone located nearby who would have the ﬁle that is
wanted. The upshot of this attribute is that the more users
there are downloading a particular ﬁle, the more available it
will become for all users of the network. Due to the inher-
ent scalability of this approach, the average download speed
remained relatively constant, even during times of massive
growth of the peer-to-peer network.
Solutions have emerged for speeding up searching, most
of them using distributed hash tables, but despite this, much
leaves still to be desired by the actual download speed in
those systems, which is very often far from the line speed
maximum, especially considering that the latest generation
of ﬁle sharing software allows the limitation of the band-
width available to the peer-to-peer network. Moreover, if
a download is slow, there is nothing the user can do to im-
prove the speed.
A number of factors play a role in download speed for
a particular ﬁle to a particular host, not least the hardware
network limitations of the participating nodes. But besides
these hard limits, the performance can be inﬂuenced by the
decisions of the peers. The average download performance
for a given ﬁle will increase the more nodes offer the ﬁle,
and the more of their up-link bandwidth those nodes offer to
the peer-to-peer network. This is especially important since
a huge percentage of participants in ﬁle sharing networks
are so called “freeloaders”, who offer very few ﬁles or no
ﬁles at all. And since the total upload speed of all nodes
combined equals the total download speed, these freeload-
ers effectively lower the average performance of the net-
work.
1There are systems which have implemented anti-
freeloader mechanisms, notably the now defunct MojoNa-
tion [16] and eDonkey2000 [6], but these systems are con-
cerned with ﬁghting freeloaders to achieve “fairness”, and
not with improving the average performance and reliability
of the system.
So what it takes to make the nodes offer more ﬁles
and more resources, and subsequently improve the average
download speed, is an incentive for them to do so. The dif-
ference to the freeloader prevention mechanism is that here,
the nodes are given incentives to share as many ﬁles and
as much bandwidth as possible, instead of punishing those
who offer nothing or very little.
Along with the increased performance by introducing in-
centives comes an increased reliability. When there is a
reason to share ﬁles, users become predictable, and thus it
is not pure chance anymore whether a given ﬁle is avail-
able in the network. This predictability of the peers makes
it possible to use peer-to-peer architectures in non peer-to-
peer areas which have a peer structure but are dominated
by either centralized approaches or by the requirement of
a cooperative environment, speciﬁcally Grid networks and
mobile ad-hoc networks.
In this paper, we will investigate the existing types of in-
centives, and how they affect the overall service quality, be
itdownloadspeedorservicereliability, inthedifferentpeer-
oriented networks. The networks we look at range from
pure peer-to-peer networks to Grid networks and mobile ad-
hoc networks. We will then present as an example a way of
improving the average download speed in the Gnutella net-
work, based on our ﬁndings.
Section 2 will give an overview of incentives mecha-
nisms used in peer-oriented networks and a classiﬁcation of
incentives. In Section 3, we apply our analysis results and
describe a way to enhance an existing ﬁle sharing network
in order to improve the average download speed, using bar-
tering. Finally, we will discuss our conclusions and future
work in this area in Section 4.
2 Incentives in Existing Systems
2.1 Examples of the Use of Incentives
Incentives in File Sharing
There is a multitude of different ﬁle sharing networks, and
some include a notion of fairness and mandatory sharing,
while the majority do not.
Most of the current peer-to-peer systems share the same
use case, which is concerned with individual users using
either one computer at home or at work. This means that
every node in an overlay network is being seen as one com-
puter controlled by one individual, where this individual
does not control any other node in the peer-to-peer network.
All what the users do in this scenario is downloading
relatively small amounts of data, for example a number of
audio ﬁles. The quality of the service they receive, which is
the download speed in this case, is usually not very impor-
tant to them. Even if the download of a ﬁle is slow, the user
is unlikely to cancel it. The tolerance to the service quality
is generally high. However, users would certainly like to
speed up the downloads if they could do so easily.
Since most current peer-to-peer systems do not include
any kind of incentive for the users to offer ﬁles, there are
only three reasons why users share ﬁles. The ﬁrst reason is
some kind of idealism, that people offering ﬁles are needed
to keep the system working. The second reason is indif-
ference: The ﬁles are on the users’ hard drive already, and
the up-link capacity is usually underused anyway. The third
reason is ignorance i.e., the user is not aware that uploads
are taking place from his machine.
Incentives in other Peer-to-Peer Networks
There is a rising number of peer-to-peer networks which are
not for ﬁle sharing, such as the Internet Indirection Infras-
tructure [14], or the Jabber instant messenger [10]. These
peer-to-peer networks are based on a cooperation model of
resource usage. There are no incentive models in place in
any of these networks. Any node performs any task given to
it by other nodes, be it searching, uploading, or forwarding
of messages.
Incentives in other Peer-Oriented Networks
Grid networks are currently a huge trend in supercomput-
ing and distributed computing. Here, the unused CPU ca-
pacity of a number of computers is being used for a com-
putational cluster, by running a client application on each
computer, which makes the unused CPU cycles available
to applications. The analogy here is that of a power grid,
where unused generated electricity just disappears, if it is
not consumed.
This model has many analogies to the peer-to-peer
model, where many independent computers are connected
through a virtual network, in order to use each other’s ser-
vices. However, in this case the service is the provision of
CPU time, or more generally resources, and not the provi-
sion of particular ﬁles.
On the organisational layer, another difference to peer-
to-peer networks is that often, many machines belong to one
entity i.e., all the computers of a computing centre are ad-
ministered by the same person. Grid networks are usually
formed only within one organisation, or as a collaboration
of a small number of organisations [8].
The “incentive” for organisations to offer the usage of
their Grid networks to other institutions is that of externally
2billing the other party for the resource usage. Alternatively,
organisationscombinetwoormoreGridstoalargeroneand
are using the resulting, larger Grid in turns. In any case, the
incentives are completely external to the system.
Notable exceptions are the highly distributed computa-
tional Grids such as SETI@home [13]. In these systems,
many private users participate out of idealism, and the rea-
son that the organisers of these Grid applications cannot use
one of the “professional” Grids is precisely because they
cannot provide enough of their incentive i.e., money. This
model only works for a few highly prominent tasks, which
need to require vast amounts of resources to make the effort
of promoting them worthwhile.
There is obviously a gap between the plain billing model
and the idealism driven model. This is where an incentive
based approach would ﬁt in, which provides a model which
is decentralized, based on internal incentives, rather reliable
with respect to the service quality, and scalable in terms of
the amount of resources needed for a task.
The users of the network, in this case companies or or-
ganisations, require a reliable and predictable environment
in order to make use of the network. This is very different to
the private user downloading an audio ﬁle, where the down-
load speed, and often even the quality of the audio ﬁle, is
usually not so important.
Mobile ad-hoc networks also have a peer-oriented
structure. The mobile nodes are organizing themselves and
forward messages for each other. Again, there are no incen-
tives for the nodes to actually do so, everything depends on
the cooperation of the participating nodes. Current research
into Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks [11] relies on the assump-
tion that nodes collaborate by forwarding trafﬁc for others
because they wish their own trafﬁc to be forwarded.
Some research has already been done to encourage co-
operation between nodes in such networks. For example,
the Nuglets [2] work uses tamper-proof hardware in order
to overcome the problem of not having a single trusted en-
tity in such a decentralized network. This is an expensive
solution which is probably fairly fragile given the suscepti-
bility of such hardware to being circumvented [1].
2.2 Incentives Taxonomy
We will now have a closer look at which incentives and sim-
ilar mechanism have been used, and categorize the incentive
models into two groups. The ﬁrst group is those which are
based on no or weak incentive models, where weak means
that there is no actual representation of an incentive in the
network. The second group comprises the strong models,
where some kind of service offering is mandatory.
We can identify three different weak models:
relying on the user this is the “classic” model, where the
users are not required to offer services. Most of the
prominent ﬁle sharing tools can be subsumed under
this point, namely Napster, Gnutella and Freenet. The
same holds true for all other peer-to-peer applications
such as Jabber [10] and PeerCast [12].
higher good in this model, the users are only offering
a service, without being able to consume any ser-
vices. This model is only being used for computa-
tional Grids and computational peer-to-peer networks,
e.g. SETI@home [13].
common interest this model is similar to the previous one,
except that the result of the shared services have a di-
rect advantage for the participants. For example, own-
ers of the digital VCR TiVo organised themselves to
crack the password which enables access to the back-
door functions of the device [5].
Besides the weak models, there is also a number of
strong models. We identiﬁed three different types of strong
incentive models:
micro currency here, a virtual currency is established be-
tween all nodes. Services between nodes (such as
download, searching, disk space) are then paid in this
currency. There needs to be a central authority of some
kind, which issues this currency, and means to avoid
inﬂation need to be in place as well. In fact, a whole
micro-economic model is needed. The now defunct
MojoNation [16] used this model.
external billing as opposed to the other incentive models
we discussed is only concerned with accounting within
the network. The actual billing takes place outside the
network. This model is what is predominantly used in
Grid networks, often without a detailed accounting.
force sharing the users are invariably offering ﬁles (or part
of ﬁles) themselves, should they download ﬁles from
other users. The only systems which are using this
model are eDonkey2000 [6] and its successor Over-
net [17]. An upload/download ratio is in place i.e.,
for each kB/s of maximum download speed, a certain
amount of kB/s of upload speed has to be made avail-
able. The relationship between the two is not linear
though, with unlimited download speed above a cer-
tain upload speed (10 kB/s currently).
The ﬁrst three weak models are not really helpful in in-
creasing the fairness and performance of the peer-to-peer
system, since they require a motivation external to the net-
work. While this works in some highly speciﬁc scenarios,
it cannot be relied on, and the offered resources will very
likely not exceed a minimal amount in non-cooperative net-
works.
3Of the strong models, the micro currency approach is
certainly the most complex one. Many additional econom-
ical problems are being introduced with a virtual currency.
Security then also becomes a major concern. All in all, it
is doubtful whether its advantages outweigh the numerous
disadvantages. There is also the problem that having a cur-
rency leads to concrete prices for all services, which in turn
undermines the “soft incentives” concept. Tschudin showed
a potential way out of this, by giving each node its own cur-
rency [15].
External billing, the second strong model, also intro-
duced a number of new problems. Most notably, it requires
an external billing structure in place, which relies on proper
accounting within the peer-to-peer network. The account-
ing in turn requires a unique ID for each node for proper
authentication and authorisation. There also has to be a de-
ﬁned price in a real currency for each service, which again
breaks the “soft incentives” concept.
The “force sharing” model has none of these prob-
lems. No logging is required, which makes in scalable,
and the services do not have a concrete price, leaving the
“soft incentives” concept intact. However, in the case of
eDonkey2000 [6], it only encourages offering a minimum
amount of resources, as there is no reward for offering ad-
ditional resources.
In the next section, we will present an architecture which
combines a “force sharing” model with “soft incentives” on
top of the already existing Gnutella network.
3 Applied Incentives for File Sharing
The next step after the incentives taxonomy is now to ac-
tually apply the incentive-based approach in a real net-
work. Out of the three possible network types, namely
Grid networks, mobile ad-hoc networks and peer-to-peer
networks, wechosetostartwithlatter. Thisisduetothefact
that there are already widely used implementations of large
scale peer-to-peer networks, namely ﬁle-sharing networks.
One of the most popular ones, which is also completely de-
centralized and for which open-source clients exist, is the
Gnutella network [9].
Our goal is to extend Gnutella with a soft incentives
model i.e., users should get rewarded with an increased
download speed for offering additional up-link bandwidth.
3.1 Requirements
There are a number of essential requirements. First of all,
our improvements have to be scalable, or rather not break
thescalabilityofGnutella. Mostimportantlythismeansthat
we cannot save state in the nodes, so we cannot keep track
of other nodes, other than for the current transaction. The
additional temporary state as well as the additional com-
munication necessary between nodes should be kept to a
minimum.
Having an incentive-free peer-to-peer system works ﬁne
to a certain extent, and it is clearly a good foundation for a
ﬁle sharing network. Yet, we want to increase the average
download speed. We want to do that by providing incen-
tives for users to offer additional ﬁles or resources, and by
attracting additional users. On the other hand, we do not
want to drive users away who do not offer ﬁles, since in the
long run every user of the system will make the network
grow, if only by increasing the user base by word of mouth.
It might also only be a temporary condition of a user not to
offer anything, e.g. users new to the network usually do not
offer anything until they downloaded ﬁles themselves.
Thus, it makes sense to always have a minimal service
being provided, even for freeloaders. Whenever users want
to improve their download speed though, they can do so by
simply increasing the service quality they offer, by either in-
creasing the upload bandwidth, or by increasing the number
of ﬁles they offer. This is somewhat similar to the concept
of super-peers as introduced in Gnutella, but here users get
rewarded for making their nodes super-peers.
Some of the currently implemented systems are very
concerned with keeping the system fair. The way this fair-
ness is achieved is that each service or resource is metered
or deﬁned to an exact internal currency equivalent (which
might be a virtual currency or just an upload/download ra-
tio), and for each unit of service usage the correct amount of
this currency has to be “paid”, in some form. Without being
able to compensate for the service, a node is thus unable to
use it.
While fairness is a good idea, we think that it is not nec-
essary for every service exchange to be fair, and that this
ﬁne-grained deﬁnition of fairness is, in fact, actually lim-
iting the overall performance of the system. Instead of a
“quid pro quo” compensation, we argue that almost any
kind of roughly equivalent compensation is enough. A col-
laboration does not necessarily have to be fair, as long as
all parties proﬁt from it. In the long run, the system must be
fair though, in order to be accepted by the users. By fairness
we mean thatthere needs to be abalance between consumed
and offered resources.
Fairness is not only important as part of the system de-
sign, but it is also vital to make circumvention of these fair-
ness mechanism impossible or at least very hard. More con-
crete, it should be on an architectural level impossible for
nodes to get more resources than the other nodes are will-
ing to give to them.
In a peer-to-peer network, all readily available resources
tend to be used (logging into any peer-to-peer network and
seeing the up-link being saturated within a minute or two
proves this point). Yet, the download speed is often far from
4optimal i.e., from saturating the down-link. The perfor-
mance bottlenecks seem to be either the performance of the
used links of the underlying network, or the lack of nodes
which host a speciﬁc requested ﬁle (or the inability to ﬁnd
all those nodes hosting the ﬁle).
Experience with peer-to-peer networks suggests that the
participants are willing to share resources which they do
not need anyway, and which cannot be saved for future use,
namely unused CPU cycles, and up-link bandwidth. Users
seem not to be comfortable with offering disk space for
random public usage, except for offering downloaded ﬁles
which are on their hard disks, of course. Losing relatively
small amounts of useful resources, such as the CPU time for
processing search requests (Gnutella), or the link capacity
for downloading another data block (SETI@home), seem
to be tolerated though. Thus, efﬁcient replication strategies
as suggested by [3] might not be suitable for the inherently
multi-domain private user use case.
Since there is no control over the peers, the only way to
stimulate the offering of additional ﬁles and bandwidth is
to provide the users with an incentive to do so. The only
existing system-inherent incentive, is to improve the quality
the users receive themselves. Therefore, a direct connec-
tion between the received quality and the offered quality is
needed.
Of course, in this speciﬁc case where we build on top of
Gnutella, we also have to be careful not to break compati-
bility with nodes running unmodiﬁed Gnutella clients.
Another important aspect is the use of feedback loops
in the system. As we said before, all the currently used
incentive-based approaches are just freeloader prevention
mechanisms. The nodes get denied service for not sharing
ﬁles, instead of being awarded for sharing more ﬁles. The
nodes are especially not being rewarded for sharing more
than the average. Thus, nodes tend to share only just as
much as needed to receive the maximally realistic perfor-
mance of the network. This results in a negative feedback
loop, where less and less resources per node are being of-
fered. Instead, the system should implement a positive feed-
back loop, where nodes are rewarded for offering additional
resources, not punished for offering less resources. That
means that the more a node offers, the better the received
performance gets.
3.2 Bartering Rings
One way of providing a direct feedback between download-
ing and uploading is to include a trading mechanism into
the peer-to-peer network. If two nodes discover that they
are downloading ﬁles from each other, they can increase
their mutual resource usage 1).
These direct trading mechanism have been discussed al-
ready in [4], and there are practical implementations of this
concept, e.g. in eMule [7]. However, this approach showed
some problems, namely the lack of ﬁnding suitable trading
partners in the ﬁrst case, and the necessity of keeping a log




Figure 1: Trading between two Nodes
In most cases, it is very hard to ﬁnd two nodes which
actually need each other’s service. While this may be pos-
sible if the nodes need generic resources such as comput-
ing power or storage space, as it is the case in current Grid
networks, we imagine it to be very rare that two nodes are
interested at the same moment in a ﬁle which the other node





Figure 2: Bartering Ring with 3 Nodes
We generalize the concept of a direct trading mechanism
to include a larger number of hosts. The more nodes are
involved, the more likely they have content of mutual inter-
est. So instead of node A receiving a ﬁle from node B and in
exchange send another ﬁle to node B (Figure 1), these two
parts of the transaction are decoupled, and the receiving and
the transmitting end of one’s nodes transaction are not the
same. Instead, all nodes form a downloading ring. In a ring
of three nodes, node A might receive a ﬁle from node B,
while node B receives one from node C, and node C from
node A (Figure 2).
In general, these rings are cycles in a directed graph of
downloads. When these rings are found, the participating
nodes can then improve the service quality (download speed
or download queue position) they perceive from their up-
load ring neighbour by improving the service quality they
provide to their download ring neighbour. Ideally, this im-
proved quality should not go at the expense of the other
downloading nodes (those which are not part of this partic-
ular ring), but by allocating more resources of the underly-
ing network to the peer-to-peer network. Inevitably, this is
5the case to some extent though, but there will still be an in-
centive to increase the actual hard limit of the percentage of
the bandwidth allocated to the peer-to-peer application.
Since we build on top of the existing Gnutella, we try
to reactively ﬁnd these rings in already existing download
relationships. Given the structure of the Gnutella network,
a prototype implementation of this is relatively straightfor-
ward, as all that is needed is to send all the uploading nodes
a list of the downloading nodes. This is enough to ﬁnd 3
node rings. For rings with more nodes, it is necessary for
the nodes to forward the uploading nodes lists they receive
to their downloading nodes.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
Afterweintroducedbarteringrings, thenextstepistoverify
the validity of this approach. We plan to do this by collect-
ing search queries and responses from the Gnutella network
with a modiﬁed client, and then analyzing this data with re-
spect to how many of these rings of different sizes actually
exist. This will give us an idea of the potential of the con-
cept. We also plan to run simulations for different replica
distributions, in order to ﬁnd out about the performance in-
crease our system could provide. This is necessary in order
to quantify the performance gain by providing incentives
to share additional ﬁles, as opposed to additional up-link
bandwidth.
If this analysis shows our concept to be promising, we
will enhance a Gnutella client to actually support our prin-
ciples. Then, we can investigate in the dynamic behaviour
and how the users inﬂuence the system with their decisions.
We will also see whether the bartering rings only lower
the download speed for those who do not offer enough, or
whether it actually makes users use more of their bandwidth
for the peer-to-peer application.
Once we established the concept of bartering, we can ex-
tend it to be used in Grid networks, and later also in mobile
ad-hoc networks. Along with the use in Grid networks goes
ageneralisationfromﬁlesharingtoagenericservicemodel.
Quite likely though, the development of different incentive-
based architectures might required, since bartering rings are
not very useful for generic resources. In mobile ad-hoc net-
works on the other hand, performance is more critical than
reliability.
Performance of the bartering rings approach could also
be improved by using a proactive approach i.e., to actively
look for these rings in the download initialisation phase al-
ready, and possibly start downloading the ﬁle from another
node if this helps to form a ring.
Furthermore, weplantoinvestigatewhetheranincreased
availability of ﬁles will provide a increased statistical reli-
ability for the ﬁle availability. Having a provably reliable
peer-to-peer network would enable new use cases.
To conclude, we argue that the area of sharing incen-
tives in peer-to-peer networks has been neglected up to now.
Many peer-to-peer networks implement the concept of shar-
ing incentives in one way or another, but the concept and
implementations used were not very systematic, and have
only been implemented for defensive reasons of freeloader
prevention and introducing “fairness”.
Properly recognizing the concept of incentives, and ap-
plying it to different peer-oriented networks, ranging from
classical ﬁle sharing to Grid networks, will potentially en-
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